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THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
CLYDE L. COLSON*
The question of ultra vires corporate action has always raised
serious and disturbing problems. The difficulty of dealing with the
question is greatly increased by the inconsistency and confusion
found in the cases on the subject. This confusion is serious enough
when one considers only the state decisions in general or even
those of a single state, but it becomes acute when attention is
turned to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
To begin with, the language of the Supreme Court is hope-
lessly contradictory.' If this were the extent of the contradiction,
the matter would not be a serious one. Unfortunately, however,
even if what the Court has said be disregarded and attention paid
solely to what it has done, the results cannot all be reconciled. It
is indeed true that the cases fall into some semblance of order when
emphasis is placed on the result reached by the Court rather than
on its reasoning. It becomes at once apparent that from the be-
ginning there have been two conceptions of the nature of a corpo-
ration which were in constant competition as possible starting
points for the Court's reasoning. And further, it is apparent that
there has been a definite trend away from the stricter conception
which the Court at first adopted, toward a more liberal one.
The Court's original conception of the nature of a corporation
was founded on the Fiction Theory. According to this theory a
corporation is not a reality but is a mere creature of the law.
* Associate Professor of Law, Lamar School of Law, Emory University;
Visiting Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I Warren, Ezeuted Ultra Yires Transactions (1910) 23 HAav. L. REv. 495,
498-504.
1
Colson: The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court Decisi
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936
THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES
Hence it has no existence apart from the law; it lacks the capacity
to do any act not authorized by the state and its personality is but
a legal fiction. In contrast to the Fiction Theory is the so-called
Realist Theory. According to this theory, a corporation is a reality
entirely apart from the law with a social or de facto personality
quite distinct from the legal personality conferred upon it by the
state. Hence it has the capacity to do many things which the state
has not authorized it to do.2 No sooner had the Supreme Court
adopted the Fiction Theory as the starting point for its reasoning
in matters of corporation law than it was found that the logical
application of this theory would in many situations lead to most
undesirable results. As a consequence, almost from the beginning
there has been evident a definite trend on the part of the Court
toward the adoption of the Realist Theory.
It is to be regretted that the Court has in general thought it
necessary to disguise its growing tendency to accept the Realist
Theory. This being true, however, in a study of the cases as a
whole in order to see just how far this trend has gone, one must be
interested primarily'in what the Court has done and only inci-
dentally concerned with what was said. But on the other hand,
in view of the fact that there has been a constant reiteration of
the Fiction Theory, often in cases which are in effect a repudi-
ation of it, one should not wholly disregard the language of the
Court, for it is clear that the lip service paid the old doctrine has
seriously hindered and at times almost stopped the trend away
from it.
Due in large part to the confusion resulting from the Court's
effort to cover up what was going on, several independent and
apparently inconsistent lines of decision have grown up and still
exist side by side. This paper is an examination of the origin and
development of these distinct lines of decision in an effort to dis-
cover on the one hand the extent to which they are truly contra-
dictory, and on the other the extent to which they may be fitted
into a logically consistent scheme. In addition, certain features
of the way in which the Supreme Court has handled the whole
matter of ultra vires transactions will be contrasted to the treat-
ment given the problem in some of the state courts.
In a study of the Supreme Court decisions, one should keep
constantly in mind that there have been two conceptions of the
2 For a more detailed examination of the Fiction and Realist Theories, see
Colson, Corporate Personality (1936) 24 GEO. L. J. 638.
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nature of a corporation which have played most important parts
as competing starting points for the Court's reasoning. A review
of the specific considerations which have for the most part deter-
mined the Court's choice between these competing conceptions will
be left until the cases are examined in detail. Suffice it now to say
that this choice has turned largely upon a weighing of the in-
dividual and social interests involved, but whether this weighing
was done consciously or not does not always appear."
I. DEFINITION OF Ultra Vires
Unfortunately the term "ultra vires" has been used by the
courts in more than one sense. This renders necessary a statement
of the sense in which it is here used. Literally, an ultra vires cor-
porate act is an act beyond the powers of the corporation. But if
by "power" is meant "capacity", then by hypothesis there can be
no such thing as an ultra vires act. The use of the term as mean-
ing "beyond the capacity of the corporation" has contributed
much to the conclusion that an ultra vires act is void. In its
proper sense an ultra vires act is simply an act which the corpo-
ration does without authority from the state for so doing.
Thus defined, the term is.broad enough to include transactions
which are illegal in the true sense of the word. There are some who
favor a more restricted definition of ultra vires. For example
Machen says:
"In its proper sense, it denotes some act or transaction on
the part of a corporation which, although not unlawful or
contrary to public policy if done or executed by an individual,
is yet beyond the legitimate powers of the corporation as they
are defined by the statutes under which it is formed or
which are applicable to it, or by its charter or incorporation
paper.'"
This definition is quoted with approval by Stevens who goes on to
say:
3 It is apparent to one familiar with Dean Pound's Theory of Social In-
terests that this approach is not in the least original. The writer has merely
attempted to deal with the question of ultra vires in the light of that theory,
with particular emphasis on the problem of the proper evaluation of the
social interests involved. See PouxD, OUTLmiES or LEcTuREs ON Junis-
PRuDuucE (4th ed. 1928) 60-71 and authorities there cited.
4 2 MACHMN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908) 819.
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". ... by its very terms, it excludes the quality of illegal-
ity from the act in question, and makes the want of authority
to do the act the sole objection to it. '
The objection made to the use of the broader definition is
that it is conducive to the error which some courts have made of
treating all ultra vires transactions as illegal. It is certainly true
that this error should be avoided and that a court should realize
the distinction between an act which is both ultra vires and illegal
and one which is ultra vires only. In order to do this, however, it
is not necessary to place narrow qualifications on the definition of
ultra vires. Aside from the fact that such qualifications add great-
ly to the length of the definition, too much refinement is likely to
cause more difficulty in a subject already difficult enough.
It would seem better to use ultra vires in the broader and
simpler sense of all transactions not authorized by the state, in
contrast to intra vires transactions which are authorized. Ultra
vires or unauthorized transactions may then be classified as (1)
acts which are not only ultra vires but are also crimes, (2) acts
which are not only ultra ires but are also torts, (3) acts not only
ultra vires but also illegal or against public policy, and (4) acts
which are simply ultra vires but are otherwise unobjectionable.
A conception of ultra vires as including all these will be conducive
to clearer thinking on the problem and consequently will promote
a more satisfactory solution of it. With such conception in mind,
a court which had already given recovery in the case of corporate
torts which are clearly unauthorized would have been less likely
to deny recovery in the case of an unauthorized contract. How-
ever much the solutions may differ depending on the circumstances,
there is the common problem in all these cases as to the effect to
be given unauthorized corporate action.
Harno has suggested that the subject of ultra Vires would be
clarified by the adoption of the Holhfeldian concepts of privilege
and power.6 This seems to be doubtful. True it is that corporate
acts are intra vires when done pursuant to the exercise of a power
which is also a privilege. And similarly those acts done pursuant
to the exercise of a legal power which is not a privilege are ultra
vires. The difficulty is that you can never tell whether there is a
legal power until the court has passed on the question. If the
5 Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and lBestatement of the Ultra
Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 297, 309-310.
6 Harno, Privileges and Powers of Corporations and the Doctrine of Ultra
Vires (1925) 25 YALIE L. J. 13.
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court decides that the transaction is void and hence that it gives
rise to no legal relations between the parties, then and then only
can it be said that the corporation had no legal power. On the
other hand it cannot be said that the corporation had the legal
power until the court has held that the transaction gave rise to
legal relations. For instance, in commenting on the strict rule as
to statutory companies in England, Harno says:
"Under this view, which appears to treat ultra vires acts
as mere nullities, it will be observed that the corporation has
neither the power nor the privilege to engage in such trans-
actions. It does not have the privilege because the ultra vires
acts are outside of the express or implied privileges conferred,
and it has not the power because any effort to create a legal
relation of this nature is futile.' 7
However helpful Hohfeld's concepts may be in classifying deci-
sions after they have been rendered, they are of doubtful assist-
ance before the fact. The whole question is whether the court
shall give legal validity to the ultra vires act. Here again it would
seem desirable to keep the problem as free from overrefinement as
possible. Certainly the subject of ultra vires is difficult enough
without further complicating it with Holfeldian concepts, the ade-
quate comprehension of which is something of a problem in itself.
Some courts have classed as ultra vires those acts which have
been done by the directors or other officers of a corporation in
excess of their authority, though within the authority of the cor-
poration. In such a case the problem is simply one of agency. It
should be treated as such and kept separate from the question of
ultra vires.8
It should be noted that the definition of an ultra vires act as
one done without the authority of the state for -so doing is
broad enough to include an act done in abuse of a general power or
without compliance with certain conditions precedent. The
classification of such an act as ultra vires has been criticized by
some who argue that we should distinguish between the abuse of
authority and the entire lack of authority.9 However, as Ballan-
tine has said, "whether such a distinction as this is sound admits
7Id. at 22-23.
8 Canal & C. R. Co. v. St. Charles St. R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 1069, 11 So. 702
(1892); Savannah Ice Co. v. Canal-Louisiana Bk. & Tr. Co., 12 Ga. App.
818, 825, 79 S. E. 45 (1913); Kelley Maus & Co. v. The O'Brien Varnish
Co., 90 Ill. App. 287, 292-293 (1900).
97 FLETomE, Cvc. OF CORP. § 3402.
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of a very reasonable doubt.' "1 Logically it would seem that if a
corporation has been given authority to borrow money for one pur-
pose and it borrows for a different purpose, there is just as much
a lack of authority to enter into the particular transaction as there
would have been had the corporation had no authority to borrow
for any purpose. In each case the corporation has acted beyond
the authority conferred upon it by the state.
It may well be that there are stronger reasons for holding the
corporation liable on the contract in the one case than in the other,
but this does not mean that one of the acts is ultra vires and the
other not. 1' It is easy to see how a court which has already estab-
lished the rule of no liability for an ultra vires contract might well
be forced to make such a distinction in order to reach a desired
result without overruling its previous decision. However, such
distinctions only serve further to confuse the problem. It would
seem better to recognize frankly that this is just another case in
which the courts have given validity to an ultra vires transaction
and that they have done so in order to reach a result which the
situation seemed to demand.
The question is quite analogous to the case of a principal's
liability for the acts of his agent beyond the scope of his actual
authority but within his apparent authority. Certainly it would
not be conducive to clear thinking on that problem to say that
because we hold the principal liable, the agent has not exceeded his
authority. The truth of the matter is that the liability was imposed
in both instances because the courts have felt that there was a
social interest demanding such result.
For the purposes of this discussion, then, an ultra vires act
is any act done by the corporation without authority from the
state for so doing. This simple and all inclusive use of the term
makes the problem easier to grasp. By adopting it we avoid many
overrefined distinctions which after all are of doubtful value. But
in addition to this, it emphasizes the idea that the question is es-
sentially the same whether the ultra vires act be a crime, a tort,
an abuse of authority or simply ultra tires. Such a conception of
the problem will tend to produce a more desirable solution.
II. EARLY CASES
Before taking up the several distinct lines of decisions in the
Supreme Court cases let us consider some of the early decisions
1oBALIANpiE, PRivATE CORPORATIONS (1927) § 78, at 276.
11 For further discussion, see infra V.-D-(1).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1936], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
in which are to be found the roots of the strict federal rule on
ultra idres.
The first case dealing with the matter is Head & Armory v.
Providence Insurance Co. which was decided in 1804.12 Although
the phrase "ultra vires" had not been coined at that time, the doc-
trine of ultra vires is stated in its strictest form as clearly as may
be. The fact that in this case the Supreme Court definitely com-
mitted itself to the Fiction Theory makes -it worth while to con-
sider it in some detail.
In a suit by Head & Armory on an insurance policy it be-
came necessary to determine whether the parties had rescinded the
contract before notice of the loss. The defendant corporation in-
troduced correspondence which it was claimed proved the con-
tract to cancel. The plaintiff contended among other things that
because one of the letters essential to the contract to cancel
was not signed and sealed by the corporation in compliance with
the charter requirements, it was not the act of the corporation and
consequently that the policy was still in force. The plaintiff's
contention was sustained by the Supreme Court.
In discussing this point Chief Justice Marshall said:
"Without ascribing to this body, which, in its corporate
capacity, is the mere creature of the act to which it owes its
existence, all the qualities and disabilities annexed by the com-
mon law to ancient institutions of this sort, it may correctly
be said to be precisely what the incorporating act has made
it, to derive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of
exerting its faculties only in the manner which that act author-
izes.
"To this source of its being, then, we must recur to as-
certain its powers, and io determine whether it can complete
a contract by such communications as are in this record."13
Again, in contrasting the natural capacity of a human being with
the capacity of a corporation, he said:
"He who authorizes another to make a writing for him,
makes it himself; but with these bodies which have only a legal
existence, it is otherwise. The act of incorporation is to them
an enabling act; it gives them all the power they possess; it
enables them to contract, and when it prescribes to them a
mode of contracting, they must observe that mode, or the in-
strument no more creates a contract than if the body had never
been incorporated.""
122 Cranch 127, 2 L. Ed. 229 (1804).
1aId. at 166-167.
14 Id. at 168.
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And again, "It is a general rule that a corporation can only act
in the manner prescribed by law.""' Of course he necessarily con-
cluded that "an act not performed according to the requisites of
the law cannot be considered as the act of the company, .... ,10
The opinion has been quoted at this length in order to show
the extent to which the Supreme Court in this case formulated its
strict doctrine of ultra vires. The statement of it is no clearer in
the Central Transportation Co. case 7 which is usually taken to be
the leading case on this subject. There is here a definite holding
that any act beyond the authority conferred upon the corporation
by the state is not the act pf the corporation - in other words, that
an ultra vires act is void.
The case is also of interest because in argument counsel for
the corporation pressed upon the Court even at this early date the
more liberal view as to corporate capacity. It was urged that the
Court recognize the difference between the business corporation
with which it had to deal and the ecclesiastical corporations with
which the law was dealing when the strict rules were first laid
down. Thus, it was said:
"The doctrine that a corporation cannot act but by its
seal, may answer for the transactions of bishops, deans and
chapters, abbots and monks, but, according to modern deci-
sions, does not apply to mercantile corporations and mercan-
tile transactions ..... The bank of England, the East India
company, and similar corporations may, by an agent, make
promissory notes, draw and accept bills of exchange, and make
all kinds of contracts and promises, like natural persons.""'i
It should be noted that this is essentially an argument that the so-
cial policy in favor of the facilitation of business intercourse de-
mands a recognition of the general capacity of corporations.
This ease is important because in it the Court adopted the
Fiction Theory as the starting point for its reasoning on the prob-
lem of ultra vires, and not because of its actual holding that a
seal was necessary. On the latter point it was soon held in Bank
of the United States v. Dandridge that not even a writing was
necessary as proof of the acceptance of a contract." In that case
15 Id. at 165.
1 Id. at 167.
17 Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 11 S. Ct.
478 (1891).
18 Supra n. 12, at 155.
19 12 Wheat. 64, 6 L. Ed. 552 (1827).
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Justice Story cited the former case with approval and then pro-
ceeded to show that it was inapplicable." Chief Justice Marshall
was not satisfied with that showing and said in his dissenting
opinion:
"Though this general principle, that the assent of a cor-
poration can appear only by its seal, has been in part over-
ruled, yet it has been overruled so far only as respects the
seal. The corporate character remains what Blackstone states
it to be. The reasons he assigns for requiring their seal as the
evidence of their acts, are drawn from the nature of corpora-
tions, and must always exist ..... The declaration that a seal
is indispensable, is equally a declaration of the necessity of
writing; . ... , 21
Logically Marshall was correct. He realized that the Court
was departing from the strict conception of corporate capacity
adopted in the former case. On the other hand, Justice Story's
opinion illustrates the way in which the Supreme Court has re-
fused to follow out logically all the implications of the Fiction
Theory whenever to do so would defeat some interest which was
felt to be paramount. It also illustrates the Court's practice of
paying lip service to the older conception even when repudiating
it.
In all the cases which have limited the strict doctrine of ultra
vires as laid down in the first case will be found the recognition
of some interest which the Court has thought was controlling. In
this case it was realized by a majority of the Court that the ex-
igencies of the orderly conduct of business by corporations de-
manded that they be allowed to contract with the same lack of
formality as individuals. Hence a modification of the original
doctrine, thus giving effect to the social interest in favor of the
facilitation of business intercourse. That this is really the pro-
cess which the Court was following is borne out by the concluding
statement in Marshall's dissenting opinion:
"I have stated the view which was taken by the Circuit
Court ..... I have only to add, that the law is now settled
otherwise, perhaps to the advancement of public convenience.
I acquiesce, as I ought, in the decision .... though I could not
concur in it. "2
Other early cases in which the strict doctrine of ultra vires is
20 Id. at 68.
21 Id. at 93.
22 Id. at 116.
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laid down may be noted briefly. Marshall's classic statement of
the Fiction Theory is found in the Dartmouth College case:
"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the maere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the
charter of its creation confers upon it .... ",3
In Goszler v. The Corporation of Georgetown the issue was the
validity of an ordinance of a municipal corporation changing the
grade of a street. It was argued that the first ordinance fixing the
grade amounted to a contract between the city and anyone who
should build on the street. In holding that the corporation had
no power to make such a contract, Marshall again said that "A
Corporation can make such contracts only as are allowed by the
acts of incorporation. "24 In Beaty v. Lessee of Knowler2r the
question was the validity of a sale of land to collect a tax levied
by a private corporation. In holding the sale void because the
corporation had no power to levy the tax for the purpose for which
it was levied, the Court said:
"That a corporation is strictly limited to the exercise of
those powers, which are specifically conferred on it, will not be
denied. "2
In the Georgetown case the Court recognized the desirability
of leaving a municipal corporation free to exercise its government-
al functions. In the Beaty case it affirmed the undesirability of
giving effect to an unauthorized exercise by a private corporation
of a power which "trenches on the common right" as does the
power of taxation. It is in such cases as these, where the Court
decides that upon a weighing of all the interests involved the re-
sult obtainable on the basis of the Fiction Theory is more desir-
able, that the federal doctrine of ultra vires is stated in its strict-
est form. But in addition to this there has been a tendency to re-
peat the doctrine by way of dictum and this repetition has had an
unfortunate cumulative effect, contributing in no small way to the
obstinacy with which the doctrine has hung on. An excellent ex-
ample of this repetition by way of dictum is found in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle where although the contract was held intra vires,
Chief Justice Taney said:
23 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 4 L.
Ed. 629 (1819).
24 Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593, 597, 5 L. Ed. 339 (1821).
254 Pet. 152, 7 L. Ed. 813 (1830).
28 1d. at 168.
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"And it may be safely assumed that a corporation can
make no contracts, and do no acts . . . .except such as are
authorized by its charter ..... And if the law creating a cor-
poration, does not. . .. give it the right to exercise its powers
beyond the limits of the state, all contracts made by it in other
states would be void." '27
However, if what the Court has done rather than what it has
said be kept in mind, it will be seen that despite the constant
reiteration of the original narrow view many serious inroads have
been made upon it. Admittedly this process has not always been
a conscious one, though as will be seen it was obviously so in many
instances. Indeed, two circumstances which have contributed to
the longevity of the strict federal rule are the fact that the pro-
cess was often an unconscious and blundering one and the further
fact that even when the Court was aware of what it was doing, it
usually made an effort to keep the process more or less under cover.
With these considerations in mind let us proceed to an examina-
tion of the distinct lines of decisions found in the Supreme Court
cases.
III. Carmxs Am TORTS
A. In General
The first lines of decisions to be considered are those dealing
with corporate crimes and torts. The same objections were at first
made against corporate liability for crimes and torts as have since
been made against corporate liability for other ultra vires action.",
However, the law is now so well settled that a corporation is liable
for its crimes and torts that no effort has been made to collect all
the Supreme Court cases dealing with this matter. The considera-
tion of only a few will be sufficient to show that the Court's ap-
proach here is the same as in cases dealing with other ultra vires
action.
Take first the matter of corporate liability for crimes. In
New York Central R. R. v. United States29 the corporation was
indicted for giving rebates to shippers in violation of the Elkins
Act. The Court referred to the earlier doctrine that a corporation
is incapable of committing a crime and then, as representative of
the modern view, quoted Bishop to the effect that:
27 13 Pet. 519, 587-588, 10 L. Ed. 274 (1839).
28 Orr v. Bank of U. S., 1 Ohio St. 36, 41-45, 13 Am. Dec. 588 (1822).
See also Warren, supra n. 1, at 498.
29 212 U. S. 481, 29 S. Ct. 304 (1909).
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" 'If .... the invisible, intangible essence of air, which
we term a corporation, can level mountains, fill up valleys,
lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can
intend to do it, and can act therein as well viciously as vir-
tuously ?' "SO
The Court then went on to say:
"We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in
public policy, why the corporation which profits by the trans-
action .... shall be held punishable by fine ..... While the
law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of
corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot
shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business
transactions in modern times are conducted through these
bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost
entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity from all
punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a
corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away
the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter
and correcting the abuses aimed at.' '31
This same line of reasoning is to be found in the cases dealing
with corporate torts. In a comparatively early case in which a
corporation was held liable for a negligent injury the point as to
the incapacity of a corporation to commit a tort does not seem to
have been raised.3 Very soon after this decision, however, it was
pressed most strongly upon the Court in a case involving the ques-
tion of corporate liability for libel.2 It was argued for the de-
fendant that a corporation is a mere creature of the law, not given
by the state the capacity to entertain malice, and hence that the
libel could not be the act of the corporation but was only the act
of the natural persons who published it. A group of cases was
then referred to "showing that the corporation is not bound by
acts of directors, when such acts are ultra vires.' '8  It is interest-
ing to note that this is the first instance found of the use of the
expression "ultra vires" in the Supreme Court Reports. The
Court had no particular difficulty in meeting the defendant's
argument.
•30 Id. at 492-493.
31 Id. at 495-496.
32Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 14 L. Ed. 502 (1852).
33Phila., Wilmington & B. R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 16 L. Ed. 73
(1858).
34 Id. at 203.
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"To support this argument, we should be required to con-
cede that a corporate body could only act within the limits and
according to the faculties determined by the act of incorpo-
ration, and therefore that no crime or offense can be imputed
to it .... But this conclusion would be entirely inconsistent
with the legislation and jurisprudence of the States of the
Union relative to these artificial persons. . . .The result of
the cases is, that for acts done by the agents of a corporation,
either in contractu or in delicto, in the course of its business,
and of their employment, the corporation is responsible, as an
individual is responsible under similar circumstances. "35
Here again the Court has made a decided step away from its
older conception of corporations, while continuing to refer to them
as "artificial persons" or "mere legal entities, which exist only in
contemplation of the law.""8 As is often the case, the advance
which the Court made is more apparent in the dissenting opinion
than in the majority opinion. Justice Daniel says in his dissent
that:
...... from the definitions of corporations aggregate, as
given by Brooke, Coke, and Blackstone, and by the express
language of this tribunal in the earlier cases decided by it,
these bodies are regarded as merely artificial - a species of
fictiones juris, created for particular objects, and vested cer-
tainly with no greater or higher attributes than the creator
of those bodies has power to bestow. Man can have no power
to confer mind, passion, or moral powers, upon a mere fabri-
cation of his own - a mere piece of parchment or paper. No
quo animo, therefore, can be affirmed of a fiction to which no
animus, or passion, or moral quality, can be imparted. ""
When it is noted that Justice Daniel was entirely correct in
saying that his view was the logical outcome of the Fiction Theory
which the Court at first adopted, it becomes apparent how far the
Court has retreated from its original position.
B. Torts in Connection with an Ultra Vires Transaction
The Supreme Court has also held that a corporation is liable
for torts committed in connection with an ultra vires transaction.
There is a good dictum to this effect in National Bank v. Graham.38
In that case the plaintiff had given the bank some bonds for safe-
keeping and they had been lost through the negligence of the bank.
351d. at 209-210.
sold. at 210.
37 Id. at 220.
38 100 U. S. 699, 701-702, 25 L. Ed. 750 (1879).
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When sued, the bank put in the defense that the taking of special
deposits by it was ultra vires and that consequently it was not
liable. The Court held the transaction intra vires but in its dis-
cussion of the case said that even if this were not so, the defense
of ultra vires would be inapplicable. In National Bank v. Town-
send" the bank purchased some bonds from the plaintiff under an
agreement to resell them to him at the same or at a smaller price.
When sued for its refusal to carry out the contract, the bank
denied any liability on the ground that the agreement was ultra
vires. The court held that assuming the transaction to be ultra
vires, the bank was nevertheless liable for conversion of the bonds
because of its failure to deliver them upon demand - that it could
not repudiate the contract and at the same time retain the property
which it had received under it. Similarly, in National Bank v.
Anderson,40 where the bank was sued for the conversion of some
notes which the owner had authorized it to sell to a third party
and which the bank had itself purchased, the bank was held liable
even though its agreement to sell the notes as agent of the owner
was ultra vires. A case more directly in point is Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Howard.4 1 The company claimed that it was not
liable in a tort action for personal injuries because its operation
of the road where the injury occurred was ultra vires, but the
Court nevertheless allowed recovery.
The considerations which led the Court to hold a corporation
liable for crimes and torts whether in connection with an intra
vires or an ultra vires transaction are well stated in Salt Lake City
v. Hollister.4 2 That decision does not properly belong in this group
of cases but it is so anomalous that it may as well be taken up here
as elsewhere. Salt Lake City had been engaged in the ultra vires
manufacture of liquor and having under protest paid taxes to the
collector of internal revenue, it sued to recover the sum so paid.
It was alleged that because the manufacture of liquor was ultra
vires, the manufacture was not the act of the city but was only the
act of its officers or agents and that therefore the city was not
39 139 U. S. 67, 74, 11 S. Ct. 496 (1891). And of. Nat. Bank v. Petrie,
189 U. S. 423, 425, 23 S. Ct. 512 (1903), where rescission of an ultra vires
contract induced by fraud was allowed on the basis that the fraud was a tort
antedating the contract and that hence relief could be granted on this ground
without having recourse to the "void" contract.
40 172 U. S. 573, 576, 19 S. Ct. 284 (1899).
41 178 U. S. 153, 159-160, 20 S. Ct. 880 (1900).
42 118 U. S. 256, 6 S. Ct. 1055 (1886).
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subject to the tax. In holding this argument unsound the Court
said:
"The truth is, that, with the great increase in corpora-
tions in very recent times, and in their extension to nearly all
the business transactions of life, it has been found necessary
to hold them responsible for acts not strictly within their
corporate powers, but done in their corporate name, and by
corporation officers who were competent to exercise all the
corporate powers. When such acts are not founded on con-
tract, but are arbitrary exercises of power in the nature of
torts, or are quasi-criminal, the corporation may be held to a
pecuniary responsibility for them to the party injured. '43
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has taken
this liberal position in respect to torts in connection with an ultra
vires transaction, for this problem still remains one of consider-
able importance in England which has always been a stronghold
of the strict doctrine of ultra vires. Professor Warren in a com-
paratively recent article argues for corporate liability in such
case.4" Professor Goodhart in reply argues that a corporation
is logically incapable of committing a tort in an ultra vires trans-
action and that under the authority of Ashbury Ry. Carriage Co.
v. Riche4 an English Court would be bound so to hold.4  He thus
recognizes the essential similarity of the problems of ultra vires
torts and ultra vires contracts - that they are both part of the
larger problem of ultra vires transactions in general. But he fails
to see that the problem is also the same in the case of an ordinary
corporate tort. He attempts to distinguish the two on the ground
that corporate liability for torts is based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior,47 but he gives no satisfactory answer to the
objection that this necessarily assumes that the corporation is
legally capable of committing a tort. The law can never make a
principal legally responsible for an act which the principal was
legally incapable of performing. By definition, the very act of
holding the corporation liable is a concession to it of the legal
capacity to commit'a tort which is certainly an unauthorized and
therefore an ultra vires act.
In dealing with corporate crimes and with torts in connection
43 Id. at 260-261.
44 Warren, Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vires Undertakings (1925) 2
CAB. L. J. 180.
45 (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653.
46 Goodhart, Corporate Liability in Tort and the Doctrine of Ultra VNres
(1926) 2 C mB. L. J. 350.
47 Id. at 360.
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with both intra vires and ultra vires transactions the Supreme
Court has recognized that the only satisfactory solution was the
imposition of corporate liability. In the case of crimes it was
seen that the legislative policy or the general policy of the law
against such corporate action would be practically nullified unless
the corporation were held responsible. And in the case of torts
it was seen that the social interest in the protection of the plaintiff
both in his interests of personality and of substance would in effect
be defeated if the plaintiff were left solely to his remedy against
the individuals responsible for his injury. Consequently, when
upon a consideration of the various interests involved the Court
concluded that the corporation should be held liable, it did not
hesitate to modify its original conception of a corporation so as
to allow that result. And it is especially to the credit of the Court
that it has taken the most advanced position in regard to torts in
connection with ultra vires transactions.
In all these cases we have seen a steady retreat from the
Fiction Theory toward the adoption of that concept of a corpora-
tion embodied in the Realist Theory, and the reason for this steady
progress has unquestionably been a recognition by the Court that
in no other way could important social interests be protected.
IV. Ultra Vires AcQuIsITioNs OF PROPERTY
A. In General
This line of cases, which definitely establishes the proposition
that an ultra vires acquisition or transfer of property by a corpora-
tion can be attacked only by the state in a direct proceeding for
that purpose, shows the recognition and protection by the Court
of the policy favoring the security of acquisitions. This interest
has long been looked upon as a paramount one and it is only
natural to find that the Court early gave validity to those ultra
vires transactions in which it was involved.
The earliest case in which this problem was considered is
Runyan v. Coster's Lessee.48 This was an action of ejectment
brought by trustees who claimed title as trustees for a New York
corporation to recover possession of land in Pennsylvania which
had been purchased without the permission of that state. In view
of the fact that the defendant introduced no evidence, it does not
appear whether he was a mere stranger in possession or whether
he claimed under the grantor. It seems rather surprising that
48 14 Pet. 122, 10 L. Ed. 382 (1840).
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the Supreme Court should have taken the position that the trustees
acquired legal title under the deed of trust only if the corporation
could itself have held the title.49 It would seem more reasonable
to say that they got the legal title in any event and that they held
this title either in trust for the corporation or upon a resulting
trust for the grantor and consequently that they could eject the
defendant unless it was found that there was a resulting trust
for the grantor and that the defendant claimed under him. But
however that may be, the Court proceeded on the assumption that
the title of the trustees depended upon whether or not the cor-
poration could itself have taken title.
A statute of Pennsylvania provided that no corporation
whether domestic or foreign could purchase land within the state
without incurring a forfeiture of the land to the state unless the
purchase was authorized by an act of the legislature, but the act
further provided that the corporation could "hold and retain" the
land subject only to being dispossessed and divested of title by the
state."0 In view of this statute the Court held that the corporation
could hold the land subject only to forfeiture to the state and that
consequently the corporation's authority to own the land could
not be collaterally questioned by the defendant. It should be
noted that though the statute in this case recognized that the cor-
poration had power to hold the title it clearly denied its authority
to do so without express legislative assent. Consequently, the
case is a holding that an ultra vires acquisition of property by a
corporation is valid except as against the state and it has been
cited by the Court to this effect in cases in which there was no
express statutory provision as to the consequence of such acqui-
sition.51 Although this holding is rather unsatisfactory because
the title was in the trustees rather than in the corporation and
also because of the statute involved, it has been the settled rule in
the Supreme Court since this decision that ultra vires acquisitions
of property are subject only to direct attack by the state.
In Vidal v. Girard's Executors,"12 decided only a few years
later, the question was whether Philadelphia could take certain
property left to it by devise. Although the Court held that the
city had authority to take the property, there is a dictum broad
49 Id. at 129.So Id. at 130-131.
51 Nat. Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 628, 25 L. Ed. 188 (1878); Jones
v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 188, 2 S. Ct. 336 (1882).
52 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205 (1844).
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enough to cover both municipal and private corporations to the
effect that only the state can object to the corporation's incapa-
city to take.5 3 Similarly, in Myers v. Croft, where the Court held
that there was a presumption that a land company has authority
to own realty, there is also a dictum that the grantor and his
privies could not raise this question in any event.5 4  The first
really satisfactory holding on this problem is found in Cowell v.
Colorado Springs Co.55 There the Court held that where a cor-
poration was authorized to acquire such land as was necessary to
carry on its business the question whether the particular land in
dispute was necessary is a matter between the corporation and the
state and is no concern of anyone else. The Court went on to say
that great inconvenience and embarrassment would arise if titles
were made to rest on proof of such'necessity.5 8 Many subsequent
cases have laid down the same rule either as a definite holding or
by way of dictum.5 7
Implicit in this rule is its corollary that even though the
acquisition of the property was ultra vires, the corporation may
nevertheless be a conduit of title. Probably the best case on this
point is Kerfoot v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank. 8 In that case
A conveyed land to the bank in trust for B, C and D, and the bank
subsequently deeded the land to them. In an action by E, the
heir of A, to set aside both deeds on the ground that the bank had
no authority to hold land in trust the Court held that both deeds
were valid. After stating the general rule as to ultra vires
acquisitions of property, the Court said:
"This rule, while recognizing the authority of the Govern-
ment to which the corporation is amenable, has the salutary
effect of assuring the security of titles and of avoiding the in-
jurious consequences which would otherwise result. " 9
The Court does not often make such a frank admission that its
doctrine of ultra vires is subject to considerations of policy.
53 Id. at 191.
54 13 Wall. 291, 295, 20 L. Ed. 562 (1871).
5 100 U. S. 55, 25 L. Ed. 547 (1879).
56 Id. at 60-61.
57 Christian Union v. Young, 101 U. S. 352, 361, 25 L. Ed. 888 (1879);
Jones v. Habersham, supra n. 51, at 187-8; Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U. S. 282,
288-290, 10 S. Ct. 93 (1889); United States v. No. Pac. R. R. Co., 152 U. S.
284, 300, 14 S. Ct. 598 (1894); Seymour v. Slide & Spur Gold Mines, 153
U. S. 523, 525, 14 S. Ct. 847 (1894); Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 450-
451, 26 S. Ct. 427 (1906).
58 218 U. S. 281, 31 S. Ct. 14 (1910). Accord, Chesapeake Beach Ry. v.
Washington R. R., 199 U. S. 247, 251-252, 26 S. Ct. 25 (1905).
59 218 U. S. 281, 287, 31 S. Ct. 14 (1910).
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1936], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
In line with the last case is Lantry v. Wallace0 in which it
was held that an ultra vires purchase of its own stock by a national
bank was not void but only voidable at the election of the govern-
ment and that consequently the defendant who had purchased the
stock from the bank could not escape liability as a stockholder
on the ground that the bank through its ultra vires purchase
acquired no title which it could convey to him. Although in most
of the cases the property involved has been realty, this last case
stands for the proposition that the general rule applies as well to
personal as to real property."'
Except for the case of Girard's Executors which contained
only a dictum, all the transactions considered so far have been
inter vivos and the American cases generally are in accord with
the rule as developed in the Supreme Court. However, when the
transfer is by devise or bequest there is a split of authority as to
an ultra vires acquisition by a corporation.62 To begin with, if
the statute of wills in a state does not allow devises to a corpora-
tion, of course the corporation takes no title because it is only
by force of the statute that a devise can be made at all. The ultra
vires problem arises only if the devise or bequest to d corporation
is valid normally and is questioned only on the ground that the
acquisition of the particular property was unauthorized. On this
question the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Habersham,63 adopted
the rule that just as in the case of acquisitions inter vivos the title
vests in the corporation subject only to direct attack by the state.
The contrary rule is represented by Cornell University v. Fiske64
in which it was said that a holding by a state court that the cor-
poration takes no title in such a case raises no federal question and
is binding on the Supreme Court.
Returning to inter vivos transactions, the question was pre-
sented in quite a different way in Smith v. Sheely05 In that case
A conveyed the land in dispute to B, a bank which though organ-
ized under an act of a territorial legislature was not authorized to
transact business because its charter had never been approved by
00 182 U. S. 536, 552-553, 21 S. Ct. 878 (1901).
a1 See also Miller v. King, 223 U. S. 505, 32 S. Ct. 243 (1912), where the
acquisition by a bank of a judgment to be held in trust was found to be
intra vires, but the Court intimates that even if it were ultra vires the ques-
tion could not be raised collaterally.
62 For a more detailed discussion, see BAI.LANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
§ 85, at 287-290.
63 107 U. S. 174, 188, 2 S. Ct. 336 (1882).
04136 U. S. 152, 174-175, 10 S. Ct. 775 (1890).
6,12 Wall. 358, 20 L. Ea. 430 (1870).
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Congress. B transferred the land to C and then subsequently A
conveyed to D. In an action of ejectment by D against C, D
offered to show B's incompetence to be a conduit of title. In af-
firming a judgment in favor of C, the court said admitting that
the corporation was not authorized to purchase the land before its
charter had been approved by Congress, it was nevertheless a de
facto corporation and consequently neither the grantor nor his
privies could question collaterally the capacity of the corporation
to acquire the land which was entirely a matter between the cor-
poration and the government. 6
This case is mentioned in order to point out that the problem
as to the validity of the transactions of a de facto corporation is
essentially the same as the problem of the validity of the ultra
vires transactions of a de jure corporation. In the case of a de jure
corporation only part of its transactions are ultra vires, whereas
in the case of a de facto corporation all its transactions are un-
authorized and hence are ultra vires. This being so, every case
holding valid a transaction of a de facto corporation is an author-
ity for holding that an ultra vires transaction of a de jure cor-
poration is valid. The Supreme Court has recognized the truth of
this proposition by citing Smith v. Sheely in subsequent cases on
ultra vires acquisitions of property by de jure corporations.0 7  It
is unfortunate that the Court did not keep this in mind when
dealing with ultra vires contracts.
B. Ultra Vires Acquisitions of Security - National
Bank v. Matthews
Because of a different interplay of interests it is desirable to
take up this line of cases separately, despite the fact that it is part
of the larger problem of ultra vires acquisitions of property.
In National Bank v. Lanier"' the bank in violation of a statu-
tory prohibition made a loan to one of its stockholders upon the
security of its own stock and later sold the stock and applied the
proceeds on the loan. After some but before all the stock had
been transferred by the bank, the stockholder sold the stock to the
plaintiff. The court allowed recovery in an action by the plaintiff
against the bank for damages because of its refusal to recognize
66 Id. at 361.
67 See Myers v. Croft, 13 Wall. 291, 295, 20 L. Ed. 562 (1871); Jones v.
Habersham, supra n. 51, at 188; Fritts v. Palmer, supra n. 57, at 292-293.
es 11 Wall. 369, 20 L. Ed. 172 (1870).
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him as a stockholder. In holding that the security of the bank
was void the Court said:
"The contract in its inception was in violation of law,
and the bank cannot complain if it is made to suffer in conse-
quence of it. "69
Because of the fact that the stock certificate was never pledged
with the bank, the result is of course sound.
However, on the question of ultra vires security the Court
took a more liberal view in National Bank v. Matthews.70 In that
case A had executed to B a note secured by a deed of trust of land
which was in effect a mortgage with a power of sale. The national
bank made a loan to B taking as security an assignment of A's
note and the deed of trust. Upon B's failure to pay the loan at
maturity the bank directed a sale by the trustee named in the deed
of trust. A thereupon filed his bill in a state court to enjoin the
sale on the ground that the bank was acting ultra vires in lending
upon real estate security and consequently that the deed of trust
in the hands of the bank was void. The injunction was granted
by the state court but this decree was set aside by the Supreme
Court which gave two grounds for its decision. The first was that
the bank had not really made a loan on real estate security - that
the loan to A had been made by B and that the bank in taking an
assignment of A's note as security for a loan by the bank to B,
which was clearly intra vires would have had the benefit of the
deed of trust even if it had not been specifically assigned, on the
principle of equity that the security follows the debt as an incident
of its ownership.71 However, the court placed little emphasis on
this point. The other and more important ground and the one
for which this has become a leading case is that even if this had
been a direct loan by the bank on real estate security, which was
admittedly prohibited by the National Banking Act, the security
would nevertheless be valid as against the borrower, the govern-
ment alone being allowed to question the bank's authority. In
support of this position the Court cited the line of cases dealing
with ultra vires acquisitions of property.
In the course of its opinion the Court pointed out that behind
the prohibition of such loans was an effort to protect the social
interests in favor of keeping the assets of the bank liquid, of pre-
6oI. at 375.
70 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. Ed. 188 (1878).
71 Id. at 625-626.
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venting hazardous speculation in real estate and of preventing
the accumulation of lands in mortmain. 2 The Court realized that
to declare the security void would tend to defeat the first two in-
terests, the real beneficiaries of which were the stockholders, the
depositors and other creditors of the bank 7 3 Also to be taken into
account was the interest in the security of acquisitions which would
have been endangered by the inconvenience and insecurity which
would follow if all such transactions were held void and the deeds
held subject to collateral attack. Such policy as there was against
mortmain and the general policy in favor of keeping corporate
action within the bounds of authority granted by the government
were felt to be sufficiently protected by the threat of ouster and
dissolution.
Thus, upon a weighing of all the interests involved, the Court
arrived at the conclusion that the ultra Vires action must be held
valid. Therefore it argued that-since Congress had not stipulated
for a forfeiture in such case, the only check intended must have
been the threat of action by the government.
"The statute does not declare such a security void. It
is silent upon the subject. If Congress so meant, it would
have been easy to say so; and it is hardly to be believed that
this would not have been done, instead of leaving the question
to be settled by the uncertain result of litigation and judicial
decision.74
".... The impending danger of a judgment of ouster and
dissolution was, we think, the check, and none other contem-
plated by Congress.
"That has been always the punishment prescribed for
the wanton violation of a charter, and it may be made to fol-
low whenever the proper public authority shall see fit to
invoke its application. A private person cannot, directly or
indirectly, usurp this function of the government.' "
This line of argument, which is indeed convincing enough, is
unfortunately reserved for those cases in which the Supreme Court
thinks it desirable to hold the ultra vires transaction valid. Though
equally applicable to cases dealing with ultra uires contracts, it
has been almost wholly disregarded by the Court in its decisions
on, that subject.
There are numerous cases folowing National Bank V.
72 Id. at 626.
78 Id. at 629.
74 Id. at 627.
7, Id. at 629.
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Matthews, the rule being applied alike to ultra vires loans on
realty and on personalty.71 In Thompson v. The Bank77 the Court
went so far as to say that any violation by a national bank of pro-
hibitions in the Banking Act would subject it only to the penalties
there enumerated and that the validity of the transaction could be
questioned by the government alone, but this has not been followed.
In McCormick v. National Bank 7  the Court held void a lease
made by the bank after incorporation but in violation of a re-
striction on its commencing business before being authorized to
do so by the Comptroller of the Currency. Not only does this
run counter to the argument in National Bank v. Matthews which
would certainly warrant the broad statement made in the Thomp-
son case, but in treating the lease purely as a contract the Court
lost sight of the fact that it was also an acquisition of property.
This was recognized in one case, 7 but it should be added that the
Court has generally treated unauthorized leases simply as ultra
vires contracts.8 0
0. Incidents of Ownership. of Property.Acquired Ultra
Vires - National Bank v. Kennedy
Implicit in the Supreme Court doctrine as to ultra vires
acquisitions of property is the corollary that the corporation has
those benefits normally incident to ownership. It is entitled to the
income and use of the property, it may sue in ejectment to main-
tain its right to possession, and it may convey a good title to a
purchaser from it. But immediately this question arises'- having
been given the benefits incident to its ultra vires ownership, should
not the corporation be equally liable for the burdens incident to
such ownership ? In National Bank v. Kennedy' the Supreme
Court answered this question emphatically in the negative.
In that case the bank had be'come the owner of stock in a
78 Nat. Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628, 633, 25 L. Ed. 448 (1878); Jones v.
Guaranty and Indemnity Co., 101 U. S. 622, 628, 25 L. Ed. 1030 (1879);
Nat. Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99, 100-103, 26 L. Ed. 443 (1880); Swope
v. Leffingwell, 105 U. S. 3, 4, 26 L. Ed. 939 (1881); Nat. Bank v. Stewart,
107 U. S. 676, 677-678, 2 S. Ct. 778 (1882); Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank,
112 U. S. 405, 413, 5 S. Ct. 213 (1884) ; Fortier v. N. 0. Bank, 112 U. S. 439,
451, 5 S. Ct. 234 (1884); Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Gadsden, 191 U. S. 451,
458, 24 S. Ct. 129 (1903).
77146 U. S. 240, 251, 13 S. Ct. 66 (1892).
78 165 U. S. 538, 17 S. Ct. 433 (1897).
TO Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 450-451, 26 S. Ct. 427 (1906).
so Infra, V.-B-(2)-(b), dealing with uZtra vires leases by public service com-
panies.
a' 167 U. S. 362, 17 S. Ct. 831 (1897).
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savings bank and had received several dividends on this stock.
Upon the failure of the savings bank a creditor attempted to hold
the national bank to its secondary liability as a stockholder. The
Supreme Court sustained the bank's defense that because its
ownership was ultra vires it was not liable.
True enough, in reaching this result, the Court treated the
liability of a stockholder as contractual and applied its rule that
ultra vires contracts are void. However, the Court's statement
that the transaction was "absolutely void" would seem necessarily
to mean that the bank never became the owner of the stock, which
would be directly in conflict with the line of cases following Na-
tional Bank v. Matthews. Perhaps all that the case holds is that
viewing the stockholder's liability as contractual, a corporation is
not bound when the acquisition of the stock is ultra vires because
in such a case its contract to be secondarily liable is void.
Stated in this way, however, the case is inconsistent with
Christopher v. Norvell.82 In that case a married woman tried to
escape liability on national bank stock owned by her on the ground
that by the law of Florida a married woman was legally incapable
of making a contract. In holding her liable the Supreme Court
said in substance that a stockholder's liability instead of being
contractual was imposed by statute as an incident of the owner-
ship of the stock.
"The statute, in effect, says to all who become owners
of national bank stock, no matter in what way they become
shareholders, that they cannot enjoy the benefits accruing to
shareholders, and escape liability for the contracts, debts and
engagements of the bank. "83
With this statement compare one from National Bank v. Ken-
nedy':
"The claim that the bank in consequence of the receipt
by it of dividends on the stock of the savings bank is estopped
from questioning its ownership and consequent liability, is but
a reiteration of the contention that the acquiring of stock by
the bank under the circumstances disclosed was not void but
merely voidable. It would be a contradiction in terms to as-
sert that there was a total want of power by any act to assume
the liability, and yet to say that by a particular act the liabil-
ity resulted." 8 '
82 201 U. S. 216, 26 S. Ct. 502 (1906).
83 Id. at 229.
s4 Supra n. 81, at 371.
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Thus by avoiding one contradiction in terms which was of its
own making, the Court has given us a choice of alternatives each
of which is equally contradictory to its other holdings. On the
one hand, it may be said that a national bank never becomes the
owner of stock acquired ultra vires, but this is in conflict with
National Bank v. Matthews and the other cases on the ultra vires
acquisition of property. On the other hand, it may be said that
a stockholder's liability is contractual and that a corporation is
not liable when such contract is ultra vires, but this is in con-
flict with the Norvell case which holds that the liability is merely
an incident of the ownership of the stock.
Or perhaps a reconcilement of these decisions may be achieved
by saying that though the liability of a corporation as a stock-
holder is contractual, that of a natural person is not. As illogical
as this may seem, the Supreme Court has intimated as much. In
National Bank v. Hawkins where the rule of National Bank v.
Kennedy was reaffirmed, this question was expressly left open,
the Court saying that "whether, in the case of persons sui juris,
this liability is to be regarded as a contractual incident to the
ownership of the stock, or as a statutory obligation, does not seem
to present a practical question in the present case. '1 8 5 It is indeed
surprising that anyone should seriously contend that the nature
of the secondary liability on a given share of stock will vary
depending upon whether the stockholder happens to be a natural
person or a corporation. However, this seems to be the result of
the holding in these cases.
Although the Supreme Court has followed National Bank v.
Kennedy,"8 there is no justification for the rule established in that
case. That the Court is itself dissatisfied with the decision is evi-
denced by its reluctance to extend the rule to situations which
though within the spirit are not within the letter of the holding.
In Robinson v. National Bank"7 the bank had made a loan on the
security of stock in another national bank and upon default had
bid in the stock at a nominal price. In holding that the bank
was not liable as a stockholder on the ground that it had never
become the owner, the stock being still in the name of the
pledgor and being held by the bank even after the sale simply as
85174 U. S. 364, 372, 19 S. Ct. 739 (1899).
80 In addition to Nat. Bank v. Hawkins, supra n. 85, see also Nat. Bank
v. Converse, 200 U. S. 425, 438-439, 26 S. Ct. 306 (1906); Nat. Bank v.
Wehrmann, 202 U. S. 295, 301-302, 26 S. Ct. 613 (1906).
87 180 U. S. 295, 21 S. Ct. 383 (1901).
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collateral, the Court commented on the cases following National
Bank v. Kennedy and said that it was " .... not disposed, as at
present advised, to push the principle of these cases so far as to
exempt such banks from liability as other shareholders, where they
have accepted and hold stock of other corporations as collateral
security for money advanced, (a proposition which we withhold
from decision,) .... "I" It is not clear that this restriction on
the rule in National Bank v. Kennedy has been definitely imposed
but it is quite arguable that it has. In National Bank v. Hulitt,R9
the facts of which were similar to those in Robinson v. National Bank
except that the bank had had a transfer of the pledged stock made
to one of its employees, the Court held the bank liable. The catch
is, however, that although the question of the bank's authority
was raised in the argument of the case,9" no mention of this matter
is found in the Court's opinion. But if this circumstance be dis-
regarded, on the basis of the result of the case it seems safe to say
that without regard to the question of its authority a national bank
is liable as a stockholder when it becomes the owner of stock
pledged to it as collateral. And of course, as applied to this
situation, the rule is put in line with National Bank v. Matthews
and the Norvell case.
But even with this restriction the principle of National Bank
v. Kennedy is thoroughly unsound. A national bank which has
invested a large part of its capital in the stock of another bank
could receive all the benefits of its position as a stockholder and
still in the event of a crash it could by pleading ultra vires avoid
all the burdens of that position. It is to be hoped that the Court
will discard this highly inequitable rule, and certainly in its de-
cisions there is ample authority for so doing.
In Salt Lake City v. Hollister9 the Court held that a munici-
pal corporation which had received the pecuniary benefits of the
ultra vires manufacture of liquor could not escape the burden of
taxation by pleading its want of authority to engage in such busi-
ness. But aside from the analogy of that case where the corpo-
ration was municipal rather than private, a just result would be
reached in the problem presented by National Bank V. Kennedy if
the Court would simply apply its rule as to ultra vires acquisitions
of property by which the bank would be held to be the owner of
88 Id. at 309-310.
o 204 U. S. 162, 27 S. Ct. 179 (1907).
S0 M. at 165.
91118 U. S. 256, 6 S. Ct. 1055 (1886).
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the stock, and the rule of the Norvell case that the secondary
liability of a stockholder is merely an incident of ownership. Such
a change in the law in addition to promoting a more just solution
would also serve to make the decisions of the Court more logically
consistent.
Little can be said for the rule as it now stands, and the Court
in National Bank v. Hawkins was indeed hard pressed to find
some justification for it. The best it could do was first to dis-
cover, in the requirement that three-fourths of the directors of a
national bank be residents of the district where it is located, a
policy favoring local management which would be defeated by
allowing distant banks to acquire stock control, and second to point
out that the then existing policy in favor of competition between
banks would be defeated by the concentration of all the capital
of a community in one concern.92 Aide from the fact that both
these policies are sufficiently protected by the right of the govern-
ment to revoke the charter of an offending bank, what the Court
really did was to endanger both of the policies which it claimed
to be protecting by making these ultra vires investments more
attractive, thereby encouraging them. Also, any possible argu-
ment as to the hardship on the creditors and stockholders of the
holding bank which would follow an imposition of liability on it
is more than offset by the corresponding injustice to the creditors
of the other bank which has already failed. And whatever may be
the arguments against the imposition of liability on the holding
bank, they have been disregarded in those cases where the bank
has become the owner of stock taken as security, though they would
seem to be as applicable in that situation as in any other.
The truth of the matter is that the Court here followed its
strict doctrine without making that careful weighing of the in-
terests involved, which weighing has resulted in its refusal to apply
that doctrine in most of the cases considered so far.
Here again, in connection with the ultra vires acquisition of
property, we have seen that by and large the Supreme Court has
refused to make a logical application of the Fiction Theory and
has made steady progress toward the adoption of the Realist
Theory. Its original doctrine was modified so as to give validity
to these ultra vires transactions because it was only in this way
that protection could ,be afforded to compelling interests, particu-
larly the interest in favor of the security of acquisitions. And even
92174 U. S. 364, 368-369, 19 S. Ct. 739 (1899).
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on the question of corporate liability for burdens normally inci-
dent to ownership, where the Court at first applied its strict
doctrine in'National Bank v. Kennedy, we have seen in the Court's
tendency to restrict the rule of that case ttds same progress toward
liberalization. As a consequence, it is not unreasonable to antici-
pate that the same considerations which have influenced the
Court's progress so far will eventually lead it to repudiate this
anomalous and unjust decision.
V. Ultra Vires CONTRACTS
A. In General
It is in cases dealing with ultra vires contracts that the Su-
preme Court has clung most obstinately to its original doctrine
that ultra vires transactions are void. Its more positive assertions
of this doctrine have been in cases where the contracts were not
only ultra vires but were also thought to be against public policy.
But even in this line of cases, both in those where the con-
tracts were against public policy as well as ultra vires and in those
where they were ultra vires only, the Court has under the pres-
sure of conflicting interests felt bound to retreat from its original
position to a considerable extent. This retreat has largely been
accomplished under cover of the questionable distinction between
a lack of authority and an abuse of authority and under the guise
of recovery in quasi-contracts. However, before taking up the
cases involving a repudiation of the strict doctrine let us consider
those in which it was established.
Here again the Court started from the position inherent in
the Fiction Theory that a corporation is incapable of doing any
act not authorized by the state. Logically applying this doctrine,
as expressed in Head v. Providence Insurance Co. and in the dic-
tum of Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle that con-
tracts beyond the power of a corporation are void, the Supreme
Court early held that a railroad corporation was not liable on notes
given in payment for a steamboat purchased ultra vires. 3 It is
interesting to observe that in this case the Court gave a clear state-
ment of the reasons for its strict doctrine as to ultra vires contracts,
which statement still remains the Court's only justification of it.
The reasons given were: (1) that an ultra vires contract works a
diversion of capital from the objects contemplated by the charter
93 Pdarce v. Madison & Ind. R. R. Co., 21 How. 441, 16 L. Ed. 184 (1858).
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to the detriment of non-assenting stockholders, (2) that a contract
to do an ultra vires act is a contract to do an illegal act, and (3)
that the illegality of this act is apparent by the provisions of a
public act of which all persons dealing with the corporation have
notice." The merit of these reasons will be considered later.
Although the position taken by the Court in this case has never
been entirely abandoned, it has been maintained only with the
greatest difficulty. Indeed, in a series of cases decided in 1877 and
1878 there was, mostly by way of dictum, real promise that the
Court was going to give this question of ultra vires contracts the
same liberal treatment it had given the problem of other ultra
vires action.
This is particularly apparent in the decisions of Justice
Swayne who in 1878 wrote the very liberal opinion in National
Bank v. Matthews. For instance, while in Railway Co. v. Mc-
Carthy it was held that a contract by the company for the carriage
of goods beyond its line was intra vires, he said that "The doctrine
of ultra vires, when invoked for or against a corporation, should
not be allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of justice
or work a legal wrong.'"95 In support of this proposition he cited
Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 6 a leading state court decision hold-
ing that if one party to an ultra vires contract has performed his
side of it, the other party is bound on the contract.
Another example is San Antonio v. Mehaffy9" where the city
was sued on unsealed securities, purporting to be bonds, which
had been issued under a statute providing for the issue of bonds
and also providing that the proper officers might "otherwise pledge
the faith of the city". It was argued that the securities were void
because of a lack of compliance with the provision for the issue
of bonds, but the Court held them valid under the other clause
in the statute. Here again Justice Swayne went even further and
said:
"If that clause were wanting, we should have no dif-
ficulty in holding that the city was, under the circumstances,
estopped from denying their validity. The doctrine of ultra
iires, whether invoked for or against a corporation, is not
favored in the law. It should never be applied where it will
defeat the ends of justice, if such a result can be avoided." 98
"Id. at 443.
95 96 U. S. 258, 267, 24 L. Ed. 693 (1877).
o863 N. Y. 62 (1875).
97 96 U. S. 312, 24 L. Ed. 816 (1877).
98 Id. at 315.
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Then n Hitchcock v. GalvestonP9 the Court came very near
to enforcing an ultra wires contract if it did not actually do so. In
that case the city contracted to pay for street improvements in
bonds which it was not authorized to issue. Notice that the only
thing promised by the city was the performance of an ultra wires
act. In holding the city liable on the contract the Court said that:
"The promise to give bonds to the plaintiffs in payment
of what they undertook to do was, therefore, at farthest, only
ultra vires; and, in such a case, though specific performance
of an engagement to do a thing transgressive of its corporate
power may not be enforced, the corporation can be held liable
on its contract. Having received benefits at the expense of
the other contracting party, it cannot object that it was not
empowered to perform what it promised in return, in the mode
in which it promised to perform.'1 0
It may be said that recovery was properly allowed on the basis
of an implied promise to pay. The answer to that proposition is
that the measure of iecovery here was the contract price and not
the reasonable value of the plaintiff's performance. It must be
admitted that this case can be distinguished from the case of a
truly ultra vires contract on the ground that the city really made
two promises, one to pay the contract price which it was author-
ized to do and the other to pay in bonds which was ultra vires, and
that all the Court did was to enforce the first promise. But query
whether the Court had any such thing in mind - the theory of
the Court seems to be that though specific performance of an
ultra vires contract cannot be granted, damages for breach of the
contract will be.
Recovery was again allowed on an ultra vires contract in
Gold-Mining Co. v. National Bank.1' 1 There the bank had made
a loan to the defendant by way of overdraft which with interest
amounted to over $30,000. The bank was expressly prohibited
from lending more than one-tenth of the amount of its capital
stock to any one person or concern which in this instance imposed
a limit of $5,000. In allowing a recovery at law of the full amount
of the loan the Court said:
99 96 U. S. 341, 24 L. Ed. 659 (1877).
100 Id. at 351. Accord, Fort Worth City Co. v. Smith Bridge Co., 151 U.
S. 294, 302, 14 S. Ct. 339 (1894).
10196 U. S. 640, 24 L. Ed. 648 (1877).
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1936], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol42/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
"We do not think that public policy requires or that Con-
gress intended that an excess of loans beyond the proportion
specified should enable the borrower to avoid the payment of
the money actually received by him. This would be to injure
the interests of creditors, stockholders, and all who have an
interest in the safety and prosperity of the bank."' 2
Here we have a clear recognition that the matter is not closed once
it has been determined that the transaction is ultra vires. It was
realized that the Court must go further and weigh the conflicting
interests involved.
It may well be that there has been read into these cases more
than they warrant. It should also be admitted that because several
were cases dealing with municipal corporations, they may not
be a proper basis for any generalization about the law of
private corporations. On the other hand, since the doctrine of
ultra vires is usually applied more strictly in the case of a munici-
pal corporation than in the case of a private corporation, it would
seem that the liberality of these decisions becomes accentuated.
But however that may be, it is certainly true that whatever liberal-
ity of approach this series of cases may properly be said to evi-
dence was definitely counteracted in 1879 by the decision in
Thomas v. West Jersey R. R. Go.,10 3 which must be considered in
detail in another connection. Suffice it now to say that in that
case, under the influence of the then recent English case of Ash-
bury Ry. Co. v. Riche,"04 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its original
strict doctrine.
This reaction did not go so far as to undo most of what had
already been accomplished but it did make considerably more dif-
ficult all efforts toward further liberalization. The changed atti-
tude of the Court is evidenced by the fact that instead of dicta as
to the undesirability of the doctrine of ultra vires one finds in
later cases reassertions of the doctrine even where the transaction
was held intra vires. Thus, while the contract in Green Bay &
Minn. R. R. Co. v. Union Steamboat Co '105 was found to have been
authorized, the Court referred to the "well settled" doctrine that
no action can be maintained on an ultra vires contract. And in
Pittsburgh R. R. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge Co.,106 where again the
contract was held intra vires, the Court gave a clear and detailed
102 Id. at 642.
103 101 U. S. 71, 25 L. Ed. 950 (1879).
104 (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653.
105 107 U. S. 98, 100, 2 S. Ct. 221 (1882).
108 131 U. S. 371, 384-385, 9 S. Ct. 770 (1889).
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exposition of the reasons for its ultra vires doctrine. Also in
Jacksonville Ry. Co. v. Hooper0 7 the Court again went out of its
way to reaffirm its stand. On the other hand, there have been
some later cases, though surprisingly few, directly holding con-
tracts void when they were ultra vires but otherwise unobjection-
able. 08
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court has made no clear
distinction between cases in which the contracts were simply ultra
vires and those in which they were both ultra vires and also illegal
or against some public policy, the Court indiscriminately citing
the one line of cases as authority for the other, an examination of
the Court's justification of its doctrine is postponed until the latter
cases have been considered.
B. Contracts Illegal or Against Public Policy
(1) Usury.
This whole matter of usury was early regulated by statute
and was thus taken out of the operation of the Court's doctrine
of ultra vires. However, it will be of interest to consider a few of
the cases dealing with this question and to bring out its relation
to the problem of unauthorized corporate action in general.
Although only by way of dictum in Fleckner v. Bank of the
United States,10 9 decided in 1823, the Court's earliest statement on
the subject of usury was far more liberal than might have been
expected. In that case A gave his promissory note to B who sub-
sequently transferred it to C. The bank discounted the note for
C, deducting the legal rate of interest in advance. When A was
sued by the bank he claimed that since the bank's charter pro-
hibited the collection of more than the legal rate of interest, the
discount was usurious and therefore the note in the hands of the
bank was void. It was held that the deduction of legal interest in
advance was not usury, but Justice Story went further and said
that even if it were, the contract would not necessarily be void. He
first pointed out that most statutes specifically declared that usuri-
ous contracts were void, and on the basis of this he argued that
since such contracts were only prohibited by the bank's charter
and were not declared void, they would be valid at least so far as
107 160 U. S. 514, 524, 16 S. Ct. 379 (1896).
108 McCormick v. Nat. Bank, 165 U. S. 538, 549-551, 17 S. Ct. 995 (1897);
De La Vergne Co. v. German Savings Inst., 175 U. S. 40, 58-59, 20 S. Ct. 20
(1899).
109 8 Wheat. 338, 5 L. Ed. 631 (1823).
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those not parties to the usury were concerned. He then went on
to say that for the violation of the charter a proceeding by the
government was the proper remedy.110 Although the case is not
directly in point, the intimation is clear that the making of a con-
tract expressly prohibited is not necessarily void even as to the
parties to the contract and that the remedy for such unauthorized
action is a proceeding by the government.
However, a few years later the Court went the other way
when the problem was directly presented. In Bank of thte United
States v. Owens"' it was held that a contract calling for more
than the rate of interest allowed by the charter was illegal and
wholly void even though the act of incorporation did not so pro-
vide. This remained the rule of the Supreme Court until the
whole problem was settled by statute. Most of the Supreme Court
cases involving the question of usury have been those dealing with
national banks, and in respect to them the contract was void until
1864 when an Act of Congress provided that the only penalty
should be a forfeiture of interest. There is a full discussion of
this and subsequent acts and of their effect upon conflicting state
statutes in National Bank v. Dearing 112
In McBroo v. Scottish Mortgage Co. 13 where the question
was the construction of a state-usury statute, the Court made the
broad statement that when a corporate act is prohibited and a
penalty imposed, the legislature must have intended as checks on
such action only the penalty enumerated and the threat of a quo
warranto proceeding. In the course of its opinion the Court cited
Justice Story's dictum in the Fleckner case, the opinion in the
Dearing case, decisions on the taking of ultra vires security by
national banks and decisions on ultra vires acquisitions of proper-
ty, saying that all these cases come under the same general princi-
ple.
It should be noted that in most of the instances cited there
was no penalty imposed. This would then make the general propo-
sition read that unless an unauthorized corporate act is expressly
declared void, the legislature must have intended no checks other
than the threat of state action or the imposition of the penalty, if
any, specified. While the Court failed to mention any of its de-
cisions which are in conflict with this proposition, it is a fair
110 Id. at 354-355.
"'l 2 Pet. 527, 538, 7 L. Ed. 508 (1829).
112 91 U. S. 29, 35-36, 23 L. Ed. 196 (1875).
113 153 U. S. 318, 325-327, 14 S. Ct. 852 (1894).
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statement of the result reached by the Court in most of the cases
considered so far. It is a perfectly sound principle and it seems
clear that no entirely satisfactory treatment of this whole problem
of ultra vires transactions may be expected until it is applied to
all cases alike.
(2) Transfers of property and franchises by public service
corporations.
(a) The public policy against such transfers.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that there is a policy
against the unauthorized transfer by a public service corporation
of its property and franchises whereby it incapacitates itself to
perform the duties it owes the public. Thus in York & Md. R. R.
Co. v. Winans1 4 it was held that by such a transfer the corporation
could not escape responsibility and that ii was liable for patent
infringements by the transferee.
"Important franchises were conferred upon the corpo-
ration to enable it to provide the facilities to communication
and intercourse, required for the public convenience ..... The
corporation cannot absolve itself from the performance of its
obligations, without the consent of the legislature. "115
And in Railroad Co. v. Brown'18 it was held that the lessor corpo-
ration was liable to a passenger for an injury inflicted by a servant
of the lessee.
Admitting, then, that there is a public policy against such
transfers and that as a check on them it is proper to impose full
responsibility on the transferor in respect to duties owed to third
parties, the question remains whether this policy is so strong as
to require that all transfers in violation thereof be held illegal and
void as between the parties. On this point the courts have differed.
In a well-reasoned opinion holding that such a lease was not void,
the New York Court said:
"We think the demands of public policy are fully satis-
fied by holding that, as to the public, the lease was void, but
that, as between the parties, so long as the occupation under
the lease continued, the lessee was bound to pay the rent, and
that its recovery may be enforced by action on the covenant.
Public policy is promoted by the discouragement of fraud and
the maintenance of the obligation of contracts ..... "127
114 17 How. 30, 15 L. Ed. 27 (1854).
115dI. at 39.
lie 17 Wall. 445, 450, 21 L. Ed. 675 (1873).
17 Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24, 36, 45 N. E. 390 (1896).
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Here it was recognized that a policy against such transfers does
exist but it was also seen that there was a countervailing policy
in favor of the security of business transactions and that the de-
cision should turn upon a proper evaluation of those policies and
of the other conflicting interests involved.
WhWether or not the New York Court was correct in holding
that the policy against transfers by public service companies is
not strong enough to make the transfer wholly void, which would
seem to be the better view, the United States Supreme Court has
held otherwise. If the Court had placed its decision solely on the
ground of the policy against such transfers, little fault could be
found except to disagree with the Court's view as to the strength
of the policy involved. However, this question of policy, if men-
tioned at all, has been used rather as a secondary ground, and the
decisions have been based primarily on the doctrine that all ultra
vires contracts are void.
(b) Transfers by way of lease.
Timas v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 1S decided in 1879, was the
first case in which the Supreme Court held that an ultra vires
lease by a railroad of all its property and franchises was illegal
and void. This case has already been referred to as the one which
definitely checked the movement toward liberalization which was
gaining such strength in 1877 and 1878. In the main body, of the
opinion the Court treats the case as simply one involving the prob-
lem of the effect of an ultra vires contract. The English cases
from 1850 to 1875, culminating in Ashbury Ry. Co. v. Riche,"' g
are discussed at length, the Court concluding that they establish
the broad doctrine that an ultra vires contract is void, that it can-
not be made valid by the assent of every one of the shareholders,
and that a complete or partial performance of it will give rise
to no right of action on the contract. The Court very neatly side-
stepped a consideration of the more liberal statements which it
had itself just recently made by saying that:
"It would be a waste of time to attempt to examine the
American cases on the subject, which are more or less con-
flicting, but we think we are warranted in saying that this
latest decision of the House of Lords represents the decided
preponderance of authority, both in this country and in Eng-
land, and is based upon sound principle."' 12 0
118 101 U. S. 71, 25 L. Ed. 950 (1879).
119 (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653.
120 Supra n. 118, at 83.
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The Court then threw in as good measure the proposition that
such a lease by a public service corporation is against public policy
as well as ultra vires and hence illegal and void on this account
alone.121 But as a matter of fact it would seem that the policy
was lacking in this case because New Jersey, where the corporation
was formed and whose policy alone could have been infringed,
subsequent to the making of the lease had passed a statute relative
to the rates to be charged by the company in which reference was
twice made to the "railroad or its lessees". The Court admitted
that it could be fairly inferred from this that the legislature knew
of the lease but went on to say that:
"It is not by such an incidental use of the word 'lessees'
in an effort to make sure that all who collected fares should
be bound by the law, that a contract unauthorized by the
charter, and forbidden by public policy, is to be made valid
and ratified by the State."1 22
But query - one of the provisions of the act was that nothing
contained in it should deprive the railroad or its lessees of any of
the benefits conferred by a prior act. This definitely seems to be
something more than a mere effort to see that those who collected
fares should be bound by the law.
But even if the Court was correct in saying that the public
policy against such leases was present in this case, we still have
the question whether the policy was strong enough to require that
the lease be held void. That the Court itself does not think the
policy is really so strong as some of its pronouncements would
seem to make it is evidenced by its decisions, to be considered later,
in which recovery was allowed in quasi-contracts.
Since the decision in the Thomas case it has been the settled
rule of the Supreme Court that a lease by a public service com-
pany of all its property and franchises is illegal and void and can
be the basis of no action at law between the parties.12a In the many
cases applying this rule the Court has made no effort to place its
decision solely on the ground that such contracts are against public
121 Id. at 83-84.
122 Id. at 85.
123 Penn. R. R. Co. v. St. Louis R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 290, 6 S. Ct. 1094
(1886); Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1, 9 S. Ct. 409 (1889);
Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman's Pal. Car Co., supra n. 17; St. Louis R. R.
Co. v. Terre Haute R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 393, 12 S. Ct. 953 (1892); U. S. v.
Union Pac. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 1, 16 S. Ct. 190 (1895); Pearsall v. Gr. No.
Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 16 S. Ct. 705 (1896); L. & N. R. R. Co., v. Kentucky,
161 U. S. 677, 16 S. Ct. 714 (1896); United States v. So. Pac. R. R. Co., 259
U. S. 214, 42 S. Ct. 496 (1922).
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policy but has more often treated the transaction as simply an
ultra vires contract. This line of cases has been most frequently
cited and quoted in those decisions dealing with contracts which
were ultra vires only.
And the Court has by no means been consistent in its appli-
cation of the rule. Consider first this statement from the Central
Transportation Company case:
"A contract of a corporation, which is ultra vires, in the
proper sense, that is to say, outside the object of its creation
as defined in the law of its organization, and therefore beyond
the powers conferred upon it by the legislature, is not void-
able only, but wholly void, and of no legal effect. The ob-
jection to the contract is, not merely that the corporation
ought not to have made it, but that it. could not make it.'
124
Then with that statement compare the result reached in the
Terre Haute case where the Court dismissed a bill by the lessor
to set aside and cancel a 99 year ultra vires lease after performance
by the lessee for seventeen years.'12  The Court denied the relief
on the ground that the parties to the contract were in par delicto
and that consequently neither a court of law nor a court of equity
would assist the plaintiff to recover the property conveyed under
the contract. This is a very definite holding that the corporation
did make the contract and that the objection is that it ought not to
have made it, which is just the reverse of the statement quoted
above. And in United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. 26 it was
held that the corporation did make the contract and that the state
could have it set aside. In fact the Court has seldom taken serious-
ly its statement in the Central Transportation Company case that
a corporation is incapable of making an ultra vires contract, but
has generally proceeded at once to a consideration of the legal
effect to be given the ultra vires contract which admittedly the
corporation had made.
It should also be noted that in the Terre Haute case the Court
applied the rule applicable to a wholly executed illegal transaction.
But it was recognized by the Court in the Thomas case that as
to the future such a lease is executory. This raises a query rela-
tive to the public policy against these leases. Would not the policy,
which invalidates the lease because of a desire to have the original
grantee of the franchise perform his duties to the public, be better
224 139 U. S. 24, 59, 11 S. Ct. 478 (1891).
125 Supra n. 123.
126 160 U. S. 1, 16 S. Ct. 190 (1895).
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served by allowing him to undo the wrong and thus resume his
duties than by denying him any relief whatever, especially when
such denial in effect makes the transaction valid so long as the
lessee wishes to perform
The truth of the matter seems to be that the Court has never
given serious consideration to this argument about public policy,
using it rather as a secondary prop for its doctrine of ultra vires.
This is borne out by the decisions allowing recovery in quasi-
contracts and by a statement in the Central Transportation Com-
pany case which has often been quoted in those decisions. In that
case the Court said:
"A contract ultra vires being unlawful and void, not be-
cause it is in itself immoral, but because the corporation, by
the law of its creation, is incapable of making it, the courts,
while refusing to maintain any action upon the unlawful
contract, have always striven to do justice between the parties,
so far as could be done consistently with adherence to law, by
permitting property or money, parted with on the faith of the
unlawful contract, to be recovered back, or compensation to
be made for it.""12
It is obviously impossible to recohcile these various statements
and the decisions reached by the Court in this single line of cases,
and it is still more impossible to reconcile them with the other de-
cisions of the Court in which validity has been given to ultra vires
corporate action. It is not possible for the Court to pay lip ser-
vice to the Fiction Theory, which is really at the bottom of the
strict language in the Central Transportation Company case, and
at the same time be logically consistent in giving validity either
directly or indirectly to other ultra vires action.
(c) Transfers by way of sale.
In dealing with the unauthorized sale by a public service
company of all its property and franchises in which case the policy
in favor of the security of acquisitions comes into play with full
force, the Court has disregarded those considerations which were
thought to be controlling in the case of a lease by such a corpo-
ration and has held the transfer yalid. Here again is a demon-
stration of the proposition that regardless of what the Ccurt has
said, its result has in fact turned upon a weighing of the interests
for and against the ultra vires transaction, the Cour not hesitating
127 Supra n. 124, at 60.
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to hold it valid whenever it was convinced that the balance of
interests was in favor of doing so.
In Railroad Co. v. Howard, where it was claimed that the
sale was unauthorized and void, the Court said that this claim
"is entitled to no weight, as the contract was ultimately carried
into effect by the consent or subsequent ratification of all parties
interested in the subject-matter of the sale." '128 With this state-
ment should be compared the many instances where the Court has
said that no amount of consent or ratification could possibly give
validity to an ultra vires contract. Though only by way of dictum
another statement that an unauthorized sale of assets by a public
service company is not open to collateral attack is found in Branch
v. Jesup,12 9 decided after the Court had reaffirmed its strict view
in the Thomas case.
Thus it is seen that even in the line of cases where the court
comes nearest to being justified in the application of its doctrine,
it has not applied it consistently but has held the transfer valid
when it was recognized that the policy favoring the security of
acquisitions demanded that result.
(To be concluded.)
128 7 Wall. 392, 415, 19 L. Ed. 117 (1868).
129 106 U. S. 468, 475-476, 1 S. Ct. 495 (1882) ; and of. Union Trust Co. v.
fl1. Midland Co., 117 U. S. 434, 467-469, 6 S. Ch. 809 (1886).
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